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MILLS v. MUNICIPAL COURT: THE PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF A MODIFIED BOYKIN-TAHL
RULE TO MISDEMEANORS
In Mills v. Municipal Court,1 the California Supreme Court made
the Boykin-Tahl rule2 applicable to misdemeanors. Hereafter, Cali-
fornia appellate courts, reviewing misdemeanor as well as felony con-
victions, will require that the acceptance of a guilty plea be supported
by an explicit "on the record" waiver of the defendant's constitutional
rights. Justice Tobriner's opinion indicated that the rigid require-
ments of the rule, as it had been applied to felonies, might be modified
in the misdemeanor context, provided that the constitutional rights of
the defendants are respected. The unanimous decision of the court
examined and approved two specific modifications of the rule and, in
so doing, demonstrated the manner in which further modifications will
be scrutinized.
The Mills court declared that the modified Boykin-Tahl rule
would be applied to all misdemeanor guilty pleas entered after Octo-
ber 25, 1973, the date of the Mills decision. In earlier felony cases, "
the supreme court had expressly applied the rule to pleas entered after
June 2, 1969, the date of Boykin v. Alabama.4 Lower California
courts had concluded that these decisions required the application of
the rule to misdemeanors as well as to felonies and had so applied
it to pleas entered after the date of Boykin.5 The application of the
1. 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973).
2. See notes 12-19 & accompanying text infra.
3. People v. Rizer, 5 Cal. 3d 35, 484 P.2d 1367, 95 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1971); In
re Tah, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
911 (1970). See 60 CALIF. L. Ray. 894 (1972).
4. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
5. Cooper v. Justice Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 286, 104 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1972);
In re Gannon, 26 Cal. App. 3d 731, 103 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1972). See De Lao v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 716, 108 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1973); Gonzalez v. Municipal
Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 706, 108 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973); Fitch v. Justice Court, 24
Cal. App. 3d 492, 101 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1972). Cooper v. fustice Court used the fol-
lowing rationale: "While Boykin and Tahl dealt with crimes of a felonious nature, they
were not expressly limited to that class of offenses. On the contrary, the California
Supreme Court expected application of this doctrine to misdemeanors because in the
Tahl case, in footnote number 10 at page 135, it indicated retroactive application of
Boykin would affect an unspecified high number of misdemeanor cases." 28 Cal. App.
3d at 289, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
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rule had been particularly significant in cases involving a second of-
fense of drunk driving.6 Courts had utilized the rule in thousands
of cases, thereby invalidating prior convictions and sentencing defend-
ants under the more lenient first offender provisions of 'the Vehicle
Code.7 The effect of the Mills resolution on prospectivity is the divi-
sion into two classes of all those who pleaded guilty to misdemeanors
between Boykin and Mills: those individuals who challenged their
convictions prior to the Mills decision received the benefit of the Boy-
kin-Tahl rule; those who have and will challenge them after Mills will
be denied this benefit.
This note will examine the foundations of Mills v. Municipal
Court and will explore the significance of the decision for mis-
demeanor defendants who enter pleas of guilty after October 25,
1973. It will also attempt to explain the reasoning involved in the
prospectivity resolution and to bring into focus the surprising anomaly
of its impact.
The Origins of the Boykin-Tahl Rule
Through the short cut of a plea of guilty, a defendant surrenders
his life, liberty, and property to the mercy of the judiciary. 8 Instantly,
the elaborate procedures which have been developed to safeguard the
defendant's constitutional rights in the full trial situation become aca-
demic. A guilty plea is not an element in a trial but is, in itself, an
entire criminal proceeding ending in conviction. "[N]othing remains
but to give judgment and determine punishment."9  Fundamental fair-
ness would demand that the due process safeguards associated with
the acceptance of a guilty plea be comparable to those afforded to
its various components.10 While it is impossible to come up with an
exact figure, generally accepted estimates are that ninety percent of
all criminal convictions in the United States are grounded on guilty
pleas."
6. See notes 105-111 & accompanying text inf ra.
7. See note 29 infra.
8. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
9. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), citing Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
10. "From the point of view of providing a reviewing court with sufficient infor-
mation to determine whether a defendant's rights have been protected, a record of the
proceedings at which a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be
just as important as a record of the trial by which a defendant is convicted." ABA,
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 34 (Approved Draft 1968).
11. D. NEWMAN, CONvICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHouT TRIAL 3 (1966); Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 LINCOLN
L. REV. 137 (1971). The following statistics have been compiled for California courts
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In Boykin v. Alabama the United States Supreme Court exam-
ined the function of the guilty plea in state criminal proceedings. 12
It acknowledged that such a plea constituted a waiver of the rights
to a jury trial and confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, 3 all of which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4
The Court declared 'that due process required that "whenever a guilty
plea is accepted the record must affirmatively show that the defendant
was aware of his constitutional rights and that such rights had been
freely and intelligently waived . . . ."'I A knowing and voluntary
waiver would no longer be presumed from a silent record. The lack
of an affirmative showing would be reversible error, even if the court
could plausibly infer from the circumstances of the record that the plea
was susbstantively valid.16
The Supreme Court of California interpreted the requirements
of the Boykin decision in In re Tahl. 7  The Tahl court first ruled
that Boykin would be applied purely prospectively, that is to all guilty
pleas entered after June 2, 1969, the date of the Boykin decision.'
8
Tahl also delineated the requirements of Boykin in somewhat more
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972: in the superior courts, excepting those of
Los Angeles, 70% of all criminal dispositions resulted from guilty pleas; in the munici-
pal courts, 26% resulted from guilty pleas and 49% from forfeiture of bail; and in
the justice courts, 20% from guilty pleas and 60% from forfeitures. CALIFoizNIA JU-
DICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATnVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNA
CouRTS 204, 223, 225, 231 (1973).
12. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), delineated new standards
for the acceptance of guilty pleas in the federal courts. The Supreme Court did not
rely upon the Constitution, but upon FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, which states, "Itihe court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a plea or a plea of
nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea."
13. 395 U.S. at 243.
14. The Fourteenth Amendment was ruled to encompass the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination in, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
15. Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 297, 515 P.2d 273, 280, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 336 (1973). The operative language in Boykin is: "In Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516, we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth
Amendment right. We held: 'Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.
The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that
an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not waiver.'
"We think the same standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea
is voluntarily made." 395 U.S. at 242.
16. People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 3d 480, 484, 498 P.2d 992, 994, 102 Cal. Rptr.
744, 746 (1972).
17. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577.
18. Id. at 133, 460 P.2d at 457, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
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detail than had been done in the Supreme Court's opinion. When
a plea of guilty is accepted, there must be direct evidence on the rec-
ord that the defendant was aware of his three constitutional rights, that
he had knowingly and voluntarily waived them, and that he had been
informed of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.
"Each [constitutional right] must be enumerated and responses elicited
from the person of the defendant."' 9
When the Boykin-Tahl rule entered the California system of
criminal procedure, it altered the prior law which had placed the bur-
den largely on the criminal appellant to demonstrate that his guilty
plea had been improvidently entered.20  Prior to Boykin, the crucial
factor had been the presence of counsel, it being assumed that counsel
would adequately advise the defendant of his rights. 21  While no de-
finitive test was developed, the presumption of validity which attached
to a guilty plea as a result of the presence of counsel was strong. The
appellant had the burden of demonstrating his own lack of knowledge
and the. ineffectiveness of his counsel. If the defendant appeared
without counsel, the acceptance of a guilty plea was put to closer scru-
tiny, but an express on the record waiver of rights had never been
required.22 The advent of the Boykin-Tahl rule placed the responsi-
bility of advising the defendant squarely on the trial court. A guilty
plea would be presumed invalid unless the contrary were demon-
strated by an on the record waiver of rights.
Both Boykin and Tahl involved serious felonies,2" but neither
specifically limited the applicability of its holding to the felony con-
text.2" The question of the applicability of the Boykin-Tahl rule to
19. Id. at 132, P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
20. Id. at 126-29, 460 P.2d at 452-54, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 580-82. "California law
provides relatively few pronouncements, either legislative or judicial, regarding the ac-
ceptance of a guilty plea; but such authorities as exist appear to be in general agree-
ment with the rules in other jurisdictions. Any variance tilts somewhat more toward
tolerance and less precision." Id. at 127, 460 P.2d at 452, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 580. See
21 AM. Jum. 2d Crim. Law §§484-92 for a survey of pre-Boykin law on guilty pleas.
21. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 128-29, 460 P.2d 449, 453-54, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577,
581-82; People v. Mendez, 27 Cal. 20, 161 P.2d 929 (1945); People v. Emigh, 174
Cal. App. 2d 392, 344 P.2d 851 (1959); People v. Loeber, 158 Cal. App. 2d 730, 323
P.2d 136 (1958); see In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212
(1973). "The court must inform the defendant of his right to counsel, but need not
inform him of the consequences of his plea; that is the responsibility of his counsel,
not the court." B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 234 (1963).
22. 1 Cal. 3d at 127, 460 P.2d at 452, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
23. Boykin involved a defendant who had pleaded guilty to five counts of com-
mon law robbery and was sentenced to death on all five counts. 395 U.S. at 239-40.
The defendant in Tahl, also sentenced to death, had pleaded guilty to two counts of
murder, and one each of attempted robbery, grand theft, and rape. 1 Cal. 3d at 124,
460 P.2d at 450, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
24. Tahl referred to misdemeanors in a way which implied that they were in the
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misdemeanors was left open by the California Supreme Court until
its decision in Mills v. Municipal Court. Mills held -that -the rule would
be applied to all guilty pleas entered in misdemeanor proceedings
subsequent to the date of the decision.25
The Mills court assumed that its decision represented an exten-
sion of Tahl rather than a mere clarification.26  While -relying almost
exclusively on Boykin and Tahl, the court did not represent these cases
as constituting binding authority in the misdemeanor context. The
court drew on Boykin and Tahl for the strength of their reasoning
rather than their strength as direct precedent, implying that these cases
were intended to apply only within the felony context. Having so lim-
ited Tahl, the Mills court was able to modify the Boykin-Tahl rule
in the misdemeanor area without the difficulty of contradicting its ear-
lier interpretation of the Boykin decision. The limited use of these
past cases does, however, make it difficult to determine the precise
authority upon which the court chose to base its holding.
Mills v. Municipal Court
On April 27, 1971, two years after the date of the Boykin deci-
sion, petitioner Mills was convicted of misdemeanor drunk driving,"7
pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere.25 On May 4, 1972, Mills was
convicted of a second offense of the same crime, for which he was
subjected to increased sanctions as a second offender.2 9 Thereafter
area of intended coverage. 'The magnitude of the potential effect on the administra-
tion of justice is apparent when we note that in California for the years 1960 through
1967 felony convictions obtained on pleas of guilty totalled 173,496. (Crime and De-
linquency in California (1967) p. 100). The number of misdemeanor convictions
would be considerably higher." 1 Cal. 3d at 135 n.10, 460 P.2d at 458 n.10, 81 Cal.
Rptr. at 586 n.10.
25. 10 Cal. 3d at 311, 515 P.2d at 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
26. Id. at 298-99, 515 P.2d at 280-81, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
27. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1974).
28. The Mills court determined that a plea of nolo contendere is the equivalent
of a guilty plea for the purposes of the Boykin-Tahl rule. 10 Cal. 3d at 298 n.7, 515
P.2d at 280 n.7, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.7. This position appears consistent with the
authorities cited in the opinion and with section 1016(3) of the Penal Code which pro-
vides for the entry of such a plea. Cal. Pen. Code § 1016(3) (West 1970). See Note,
Nolo Contendere-Its Use and Effect 52 CALIF. L. REv. 408 (1964). It has been de-
termined that the suspension of a driver's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles
after a conviction of drunk driving based on a plea of nolo contendere is not barred
as is the use of the plea in a subsequent civil suit. Christensen v. Orr, 275 Cal. App.
2d 12, 79 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1969).
29. Section 23102 of the Vehicle Code first defines misdemeanor drunk driving
and prescribes sentencing for first offenders, and then provides that a person convicted
of a second offense be punished by a minimum of 48 hours in jail and a fine of $250.
The statute gives the trial judge no power to reduce the sentence below these mini-
mtums. CAL. VH. CODE § 23102 (West Supp. 1974). The Vehicle Code further pro-
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in municipal court, Mills moved to set aside the first conviction on the
grounds that it violated the Boykin-Tahl rule. ° In accepting the plea
of nolo contendere, the municipal court had made no effort to comply
with the rule. "The record . . .contains no indication that the de-
fendant was aware of his constitutional rights or had been advised of
such rights by either his counsel or the court, nor does it reveal that
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights by his guilty
plea."31  Clearly, if the Boykin-Tahl rule were applicable to misde-
meanors, the motion would have to be granted. The municipal court
denied the motion. Mills petitioned the superior court for a writ direc-
ting the municipal court to set aside the first conviction. The superior
court denied the writ, stating that the Boykin-Tahl rule was not appli-
cable to misdemeanors. The court of appeal reversed, and the case
was appealed to the California Supreme Court.
In reversing -the court of appeal, the supreme court ruled on three
distinct legal issues: should the Boykin-Tahl rule be applied to misde-
meanors; how, if at all, could the strict requirements of the rule be
relaxed in the misdemeanor context; and should the court's resolution
of these issues be given only prospective application.
Application of Boykin-Tahl to Misdemeanors
Four years after In re Tahl, the supreme court, in Mills, has
clarified the applicability of the rule to misdemeanors .1 2  In the in-
terim, lower California courts had considered the matter and had con-
cluded that In re Tahl compelled the application of the rule in mis-
demeanor as well as felony cases.3 3  The Mills court reached a similar
result, but it chose not to base its conclusion on the precedent of Tahl.
The court's opinion took the form of a two-part analysis. The
first and most crucial part was grounded firmly on the notion of logic.
While both Boykin and Tahl involved serious felonies,34 neither case
specifically excluded misdemeanors from its purview. 5 The Mills
vides for a suspension of driving privileges for a minimum of one year as further pun-
ishment for the second offender. Id. § 13352.
30. When the suspension of a driver license under section 23102 of the Vehicle
Code is activated by the presence of a prior conviction, the constitutional basis of such
conviction must be examined if it is challenged by proper allegations. Mitchell v. Orr,
268 Cal. App. 2d 813, 74 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1969). The Mitchell v. Orr situation has
been the setting for frequent applications of the Boykin-Tahl rule in the misdemeanor
context prior to the decision in Mills. See text accompanying notes 105-107 infra.
31. 10 Cal. 3d at 293, 515 P.2d at 277, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
32. Id. at 297-302, 515 P.2d at 279-83, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 335-39.
33. See cases cited note 5 supra.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. See note 5 supra for a discussion of a footnote in TaN implying that that
case did address misdemeanors as well as felonies.
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court determined that -the rationale behind Boykin and Tahl was
equally applicable to misdemeanors and to felonies. 3 6  In California,
the misdemeanor defendant is entitled to all three of the rights men-
tioned in the Boykin decision." Consequently, the court deemed it
logical to apply the safeguards in Boykin to misdemeanor guilty pleas.
38
While this logical analysis is both rational and satisfying, it does
not confront some of the legal issues which appear at the heart of the
question. Boykin is based on the Fourteenth Amendment, expressly
addressing itself to rights under -the federal Constitution.89 There is,
however, no federal right to trial by jury for offenses involving poten-
tial imprisonment of less than six months.40  Hence, when the Mills
court stated that "the entry of a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor em-
bodies the same waiver of constitutional rights that was present in Boy-
kin or Tahl,"4 1 it glossed over a slight distinction. While the same
conceptual rights are involved, the constitutional foundations are some-
what different. The court dealt with this issue in a footnote, declaring
that its own "supervisory authority over state criminal procedures"
gave it the right to impose a similar safeguard on the state-granted
right as the Supreme Court had placed on the federal right.4"
The problem raised by this distinction is one of authority. As
Boykin was concerned exclusively with federal rights, presumptively
it was not intended to apply in the misdemeanor context. Nowhere
in Mills does the court rebut this presumption. The court states, in-
stead, that it has determined -that the Boykin-Tahl requirements are
applicable to misdemeanors. 43 While the court nowhere directly ex-
presses the concept, it seems clear that Mills does not interpret Boykin
36. The court excluded criminal proceedings terminated by the forfeiture of bail
and "infractions," which it defined as proceedings in which incarceration is not an ap-
plicable sanction. 10 Cal. 3d at 302 nn.1l & 13, 515 P.2d at 283 nn.11 & 13, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 339 nn.1l & 13.
37. The right to confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination are
guaranteed to misdemeanor as well as felony defendants. See, e.g., Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937);
Couselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). In California, the right to trial by
jury is guaranteed to all criminal defendants. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (West 1954);
CAL. PmF. CODE § 689 (West 1970).
38. 'The People have suggested no logical basis for confining the rulings of Boy-
kin and Tahl to the felony context in which they were enunciated, and we can discern
no rational ground for such a distinction." 10 Cal. 3d at 299, 515 P.2d at 281, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 337.
39. "The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a pro-
ceeding is of course governed by federal standards. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,
422." 395 U.S. 238, 243.
40. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
41. 10 Cal. 3d at 299, 515 P.2d at 280-81, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37.
42. Id. at 298-99 n.8, 515 P.2d at 280-81, n.8, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37 n.8.
43. Id. at 301-02, 515 P.2d at 282-83, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
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and Tahl, but that it uses those decisions as an analogy upon which
to base its declaration of a new California rule.
In deciding Mills, the supreme court was free of the restraints
of prior case law. Since Boykin and Tahl concerned only the felony
context, they had no direct weight as precedent in this area. The su-
preme court was called upon to fashion new law, but it appeared reluc-
tant to betray its own legislative function. Rather than openly iden-
tifying and weighing the practical issues associated with the problem,
it chose to discuss the prior case law in a manner which suggested
that its ultimate conclusion was somehow to be found therein. This
technique was particularly marked in the second part of the analysis,
in which the court focused on the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin.44
In Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court held that "ab-
sent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."4 5 Argersinger is
presented in Mills as suggestive of a policy of applying the Boykin-
Tahl rule only to cases involving actual imprisonment.
Rather than dismissing the actual imprisonment theory in a mere
sentence, the court devoted three pages to its systematic destruction. 6
Initially, the court interpreted Argersinger not as a limitation on the
right to counsel but as an insistence upon that right in all cases result-
ing in actual imprisonment. Secondly, the court differentiated be-
,tween the extent of rights under the federal Constitution and those
guaranteed to defendants in California and concluded "as a matter of
logic"'4 7 that because they differed, the Argersinger case was inappli-
cable. Finally, the court examined the purely practical difficulties of
making a pretrial prediction of whether or not actual imprisonment
is a likely sanction, and concluded that this procedure would be far
too burdensome to be practical.
The discussion of the Argersinger suggestion is largely a hollow
exercise. The arguments raised against it by the court are powerful
and obvious, making the entire section appear to be little more than
shadow boxing.
Having discussed the logic of the situation and the inapplicability
of Argersinger, the court stated:
Thus, on the basis of both the rationale of the Boykin and Tahl
decisions and the practicalities of the situation, we now conclude
that the Boykin-TahI requirement of an explicit "on the record"
44. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
45. Id. at 37.
46. 10 Cal. 3d at 299-301, 515 P.2d at 281-82, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
47. Id. at 300, 515 P.2d at 282, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights is applicable to the
acceptance of all guilty pleas-to both felonies -and misdemeanors
48
It remains somewhat unclear Whether the court based its decision on
the federal Constitution, the California Constitution, 49 or its own "su-
pervisory authority over state crimninal procedures." A close reading
of the opinion suggests that the decision actually represents a "judi-
cially declared rule of criminal procedure." 50  The net effect of the
lengthy discussion of prior case law seems little more -than a camou-
flage for the court's ultimately legislative action.
The court mentioned -the "practicalities of the situation" as one
of the bases of its decision, and yet -the opinion failed to investigate
these considerations. Inherent throughout is the unspoken premise
that much more will be gained by the application of the rule -than will
be lost." A careful analysis of this element in the court's reasoning
would have served as an excellent justification for the decision and
would have established a good precedent for future cases in which
courts are confronted with open questions which must eventually turn
upon policy considerations.
Had the court openly recongized its legislative function, it could
have developed an impressive foundation for its decision. The appli-
cation of the rule will requirejlittle additional judicial effort and will
accomplish two valuable objectives. Primarily, it will place the bur-
den on the court to insure that guilty pleas are wisely made. So sig-
nificant an action as the entry of a guilty plea would seem to demand
little less. 52 Secondly, the rule will make appellate review of guilty
plea convictions a simple matter of examining the record for the Boy-
kin-Tahl requirements. Fewer frivolous appeals will be taken and less
appellate energy will be expended. 3  A final element which the court
48. Id. at 301, 515 P.2d at 282-83, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39 (footnotes omitted).
49. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
50. People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 461, 503 P.2d 1313, 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr.
305, 313 (1972).
51. The American Bar Association advocates the extension of procedural reforms
such as the Boykin-Tahl rule to the misdemeanor context. "It does not follow, how-
ever, that the standards would not apply in all cases before criminal courts of limited
jurisdiction, such as those which may only dispose of misdemeanors or certain misde-
meanors. Current practices in many of these courts are such that procedural reform
consistent with these standards is particularly urgent. ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GunTY 1 (Ap-
proved Draft 1968).
52. See Notes 8-11 & accompanying text supra.
53. Discussing FED. R. Cim. P. 11, the Supreme Court stated, "it is designed
to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that
a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce
a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this volun-
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must have considered in its ruling was its own intention to relax the
requirements of the rule in the misdemeanor context, thereby lessen-
ing the additional burden on the courts.
Modification of Boykin-Tahl in the Misdemeanor Context
After concluding that the Boykin-Tahl rule would be applied in
the misdemeanor context, the Mills court ruled that the requirements
of the rule would be less rigid there than in felony cases. The court
opened its discussion of this modification with the sentence, "As this
court has recognized in the past, relevant differences in the misde-
meanor and felony contexts will frequently justify a difference in pro-
cedures. '54  Inherent in this thought is the notion that some crimes
involve such drastic sanctions that they must be handled meticulously
at each stage of the proceedings. Others involve less dire conse-
quences which leave room for procedural relaxations, if they result in
valuable savings in judicial effort.
There are many precedents in California law which assume a pro-
cedural distinction between the misdemeanor and the felony contexts.
The court explored two of these in some detail. The first is the legis-
lative policy by which a defendant for a misdemeanor,5 5 but not a
felony,56 is permitted to enter a plea of guilty through counsel. The
second distinction follows the holding of In re Johnson.57 In that case,
a municipal court informed a group of defendants of their right to
counsel by addressing them en masse. The supreme court saw no
constitutional problem in this judicial short cut. Relaxations such as
this mass reading of rights were deemed permissible as long as there
was "no impairment of the fundamental constitutional rights of any
defendant."5 8  Drawing largely on In re Johnson, the supreme court
in Mills set forth the proposition that the Boykin-Tahl rule might be
relaxed as applied to misdemeanors as long as its fundamental pur-
tariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more
it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the nu-
merous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of
guilty pleas." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (footnotes omit-
ted).
54. 10 Cal. 3d at 302, 515 P.2d at 283, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
55. "In the case of a misdemeanor triable in any inferior court the plea of the
defendant may be made by said defendant or by his counsel." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1429
(West 1970).
56. "Unless otherwise provided by law every plea must be put in by the defend-
ant himself in open court." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West 1970). It is nowhere pro-
vided by law that a defendant may otherwise enter a guilty plea to a felony charge. As
a result, this section rules out that possibility.
57. 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
58. id. at 336, 398 P.2d at 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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poses were realized. The court examined the rule and concluded that
it had two essential purposes: the assurance of intelligently entered
pleas of guilty and the creation of a record to facilitate review.59
The court first confronted the issue of California Penal Code sec-
tion 1429, which provides for the entry of a plea of guilty to a misde-
meanor charge through counsel.60  This procedure presented a diffi-
cult problem 1 in the context of Mills. The court obviously considered
the procedure a valuable one,61 affording great convenience to the
misdemeanor defendant.6 3 Clearly, however, Boykin and Tahl envi-
sioned the presence of the defendant at the trial.6" Tahl stated that
"[e]ach [constitutional right] must be enumerated and responses elic-
ited from the person of the defendant."0' 5 Pre-Boykin California law
rested great reliance upon the responsibility of counsel.66 Boykin and
TahI ruled that the responsibility of advising a defendant on the sub-
ject of a guilty plea was no longer to be entrusted solely to the defend-
ant's counsel. How then could the Boykin-Tahl rule be modified so
as to encompass Penal Code section 1429?
In answering this question, the court relied upon the fact of the
"Wicks" case (People v. Superior Court), the companion case
to Mills.6 7 Petitioner Wicks utilized section 1429 to enter a plea of
guilty to a misdemeanor drunk-driving charge. In so doing, he had
completed a form which enumerated -his rights, advised him of the po-
tential consequences of his plea, and recorded a waiver of his rights.6 8
The form was "drafted both to be understandable to the average lay-
59. 10 Cal. 3d at 305, 515 P.2d at 285, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 341. See note 53 supra.
60. See note 55 supra.
61. CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF TRIAL JUDGES, MISDEMEANOR PROCEDURE BENCH
BOOK 46 (1971).
62. 10 Cal. 3d at 306, 515 P.2d at 286, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
63. The court has previously held that the convenience of the defendant may be
considered in determining whether a procedure may be modified in misdemeanor pro-
ceedings. "While there can be no impairment of the fundamental constitutional rights
of any defendant, however minor his crime, in certain situations there may be a choice
of valid ways to implement these rights. Where such is the case-and constitutional
rights are respected-the convenience of the parties and the court should be given con-
siderable weight." In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 336, 398 P.2d 420, 427, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 235.
64. "What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused
to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its conse-
quences." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44. FED. R. Caml. P. 11 also calls
for the presence of the defendant. See note 5 infra.
65. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132, 460 P.2d 449, 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584 (1969).
66. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
67. 10 Cal. 3d at 294-97, 515 P.2d at 277-79, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 333-35.
68. Id. at 312-13, 515 P.2d at 290-91, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47.
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man and to require personal 'participation' by the defendant so as to
ensure that he actually read the form." 69  The supreme court ruled
that the basic purposes of the Boykin-Tahl rule were satisfied by this
procedure. In its praise of the Wicks procedure, the court demon-
strated its intent to elevate substance over form when reviewing guilty
pleas entered through counsel. The mere presence of a defendant's
signature at the foot of an enormous form clearly would be unaccept-
able. The court summarized:
Our conclusion that a guilty plea entered through counsel is valid
so long as it is accompanied by an adequately documented show-
ing that the defendant was aware of his consitutional rights and
knowingly and intelligently waived them harmonizes the interests
underlying the Boykin-Tahl rule, on the one hand, and the defend-
ant's statutory right to appear through counsel, on the other.70
As a second distinction ,between the misdemeanor and felony con-
texts, the court endorsed, by way of elaborate dictum, a procedure
analogous to that utilized in In re Johnson.71  A guilty plea may be
effective even when a trial judge advises several defendants of their
constitutional rights in a group, provided that this procedure is coupled
with added safeguards.72 Prior to arraignment, each defendant must
be asked whether or not he understood the general statement. In
the event of a guilty plea, the defendant's waiver of his rights must
be recorded either on a written form or stenographically transcribed.7 3
In concluding this portion of the opinion, the court stated:
These suggestions, of course, are merely illustrative and do not ex-
haust the various acceptable means that courts may devise to pro-
mote the efficient administration of justice without impairing con-
stitutional rights. 74
It is apparent that this catchall sentence must be read in the light of
the two purposes which the court deemed central to Boykin and Tahl:
the assurance that guilty pleas are intelligently entered, and the crea-
tion of a complete record for review.7 5 The degree to which any new
variation from the exact requirements of Tahl will be acceptable will
be determined by the extent to which it fulfills these purposes.
69. Id. at 305, 515 P.2d at 285, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
70. Id.
71. 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228. See text accompanying
notes 57-58 supra.
72. Although the court did not finally decide the issue, it expressed marked dis-
taste for a procedure by which multiple defendants are advised of their rights by a
court clerk rather than by the judge. 10 Cal. 3d at 307 n.17, 515 P.2d 287 n.17, 110
Cal. Rptr. at 343 n.17. See In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr.
212 (1973).
73. 10 Cal. 3d at 307, 515 P.2d at 287, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 305, 515 P.2d at 285, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
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Mills Ruling Given Prospective Application
Having concluded that the Boykin-Tahl rule would be applied to
misdemeanors, and having delineated the extent of its requirements
in -that context, the supreme court next addressed the issue of pros-
pectivity.78 In re Tahi, after interpreting the effect of Boykin v. Ala-
bama, proclaimed that the Boykin rule would be applied from the date
of the Supreme Court's decision. It was left for the Mills court to
determine whether or not its extension of that rule to misdemeanors
would be applied from -the date of Boykin or made prospective from
the date of Mills itself. It chose -the latter option. Pleas of guilty
entered after October 25, 1973 would be,,subject to the rule; others
would be reviewed with reference to pre-Boykin law.7 7  Ironically, pe-
titioner Mills, whose expenditures and perserverance were instru-
mental in effecting this change, was denied its benefit. As a precedent,
.the Mills decision can hardly be viewed as an encouragement to those
who might consider challenging an unjust provision in the existing
law.
78
In reaching its decision, the Mills court relied upon the Linkletter-
Tehan test,7 9 which requires an analysis of three aspects of the change
in the law: the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on
the old rule, and the effect of retroactive application upon the adminis-
tration of justice. 0  The promulgation of this test by the Supreme
Court in Linkletter v. Walker81 -represented a victory of the "Austin-
ians" over the "Blackstonians."8' s The former theoreticians are those
who view the law as court created, while the latter subscribe to a na-
tural law theory in which the function of the court is more that of
revelation than creation. Prior to Linkletter a revision of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution would be applied retrospec-
tively as a matter of course-it would not be thought of as new law,
but merely the correction of a prior misinterpretation.8 3  In Linkletter
76. Id. at 308-11, 515 P.2d at 287-89, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 343-45.
77. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
78. "Pure prospectivity, however, should be avoided in all but the most excep-
tional cases, in order to retain the incentive of the self-interested prisoner to challenge
outmoded rules or procedures." Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure Decisions,
55 IowA L. Rav. 1309, 1327 (1970) (contains an excellent discussion of the prospectiv-
ity issue).
79. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (applying Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) prospectively): Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (applying
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) prospectively).
80. 10 Cal. 3d at 308, 515 P.2d at 287, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
81. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
82. Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 Iowk L. REv. 1309-
13 (1970).
83. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51
VA. L. RPv. 201, 204-05 (1965).
September 1974] MISDEMEANOR GUILTY PLEAS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
v. Walker, the Supreme Court surveyed the existing law on the sub-
ject and concluded, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Black,84 that
the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect."
Whether or not a constitutional ruling should be given this effect is
a question to be determined on the circumstances of each case. To
provide a framework for this determination, the Court articulated the
three point test, which has become the standard in the California"
as well as the federal courts.
87
In two prior cases involving the Boykin-Tahl rule, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court applied the Linkletter-Tehan test and concluded
that particular rulings should be given prospective effect. In re Tahl
examined -the Boykin opinion with reference to the Linkletter-Tehan
criteria and ruled that its requirements should not be applied retro-
actively.88 People v. Gallegos89 examined a prior court decision90 re-
quiring the extension of the Boykin-Tahl rule to the submission of the
defendant's case on the transcript when such a submission is tanta-
mount to a plea of guilty. Gallegos afforded this extension of Tahl
a merely prospective application."
Tahl and Gallegos concerned changes in the law regarding guilty
pleas and their equivalents. These cases relied upon the Linkletter-
Tehan test, and both ultimately concluded that an analysis of the Link-
letter-Tehan criteria demanded prospective application. The issue
in each of these cases was similar to that involved in Mills, and their
holdings appeared persuasive. Nevertheless, the court analyzed the
Linkletter-Tehan criteria as they related to the specific situation at
84. "Careful analysis of the Court's opinion shows that it rests on the premise
that a State's assumed interest in sustaining convictions obtained under the old, repudi-
ated rule outweighs the interests both of that State and of the individuals convicted in
having wrongful convictions set aside. It certainly offends my sense of justice to say
that a State holding in jail people who were convicted by unconstitutional methods has
a vested interest in keeping them there that outweighs the right of persons adjudged
guilty of crime to challenge their unconstitutional convictions at any time." 381 U.S.
618, 652-53 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
85. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
86. Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1973); People v. Gallegos, 4 Cal. 3d 242, 481 P.2d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1971);
In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
87. E.g., Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244 (1969); Destefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
88. Tahl relied heavily on Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969), which
gave prospective application to McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). See
note 12 supra.
89. 4 Cal. 3d 242, 481 P.2d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1971).
90. In re Mosley, 1 Cal. 3d 913, 464 P.2d 473, 83 Cal. Rptr. 809, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 905 (1970).
91. 4 Cal. 3d 242, 246, 481 P.2d 237, 239, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229, 231 (1971).
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hand. This approach was clearly consistent with the basic concept of
the Linkletter-Tehan test which requires an individualized approach
to the resolution of the prospectivity issue in every case. The actual
application of the test, however, appears somewhat perfunctory and
overly conscious of the result obtained in Gallegos and Tahi.
The essence of the Linkletter-Tehan test is clearly a balancing
of the effects a retroactive application of a new procedural rule would
produce. Any retroactive application will involve disruptions; old con-
victions are made subject to challenge even though they were consti-
tutionally sound when they were obtained. Nevertheless, if the change
in the law involves the resurrection of some previously unrecognized
constitutional right, it may well be 'that this disruption is justified by
the benefit of cleansing the record of past injustices. A careful appli-
cation of the Linkletter-Tehan criteria brings to the court's attention
the various elements which weigh in this balancing.
Focusing on the first element of the test, the court declared that
it found the purpose of the Boykin-Tahl rule to be largely "prophylac-
tic."92 By the use of -this term the court implied that the Boykin-TahI
rule was no more than an additional procedural safeguard which ef-
fected no change in the substantive law. While Justice Peters had
questioned this label in his concurring and dissenting opinion to
Tahl,9" the majority of the supreme court had made the same deter-
mination in both Tahl94 and Gallegos.5  Since the rule is merely "pro-
phylactic," appellants who are denied its benefit ;are not deprived of
any substantive rights, but are merely required to seek protection of
those rights under the existing safeguards. "Thus we do not defeat
the purpose of our decision by confining its 'application to future
cases." 6 A more justified conclusion would have been that the ability
of appellants to challenge guilty pleas on the 'basis of pre-Boykin law,
and thus to safeguard their substantive rights in an alternative fashion,
renders the case for a retroactive application significantly less com-
pelling. Nevertheless, the fact that Mills extended the Boykin-Tahl
rule to misdemeanor guilty pleas suggests that the prior safeguards as-
sociated with such pleas were inadequate. It is likely that some guilty
pleas may have been accepted which not only would have violated the
procedures set forth in Mills, but which also constituted deprivations
of substantive rights which the traditional procedures failed to protect.
The court's analysis of the first criterion was to be expected. It
had made an identical analysis in both TahI and Gallegos. The actual
92. 10 Cal. 3d at 308, 515 P.2d at 287, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
93. 1 Cal. 3d at 140, 460 P.2d at 462, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (Peters, I., concur-
ring and dissenting).
94. Id. at 135, 460 P.2d at 458, 81 P.2d 586.
95. 4 Cal. 3d 242, 248, 481 P.2d 237, 240, 93 Cal. Rptr. 229, 233 (1971).
96. 10 Cal. 3d at 309, 515 P.2d at 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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distinction between the cases involves the second element of the Link-
letter-Tehan test, the extent of reliance on the old rule. The rulings
examined in Gallegos and Tahl represented dramatic changes in the
existing law. Whether their holdings might have been anticipated is
debatable, but it seems clear that there had been widespread, and
quite justified, reliance on the old rule.
The same is not true of the holding of Mills v. Municipal Court.
The widespread belief prior to Mills was that Boykin and Tahl them-
selves were applicable to misdemeanors and that a decision such as
Mills was unnecessary. 97 For example, the California College of Trial
Judges Misdemeanor Bench Book, published in 1971, contains the fol-
lowing:
It seems clear that the rule requiring the record to contain "on
its face direct evidence that the accused was aware [of the enum-
erated constitutional rights], as well as the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea" (In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122,
132, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584 (1969)), applies to misdemeanors
as well as felonies. Although both Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274, 89 S.Ct 1709 (1969), and In re Tahl,
supra, involved pleas of guilty to felonies carrying the death
penalty, neither opinion by its terms is restricted to felony cases
... .For the recommendation that the rule be applied in all
cases, see A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 1 (1968).98
The appellate courts which had handled the question had ruled in
favor of the applicability of the rule.99 The Mills court acknowledged
the existence of these decisions, but it nowhere confronted the fact
that they represented the norm rather than the exception.' 00 Instead,
the court stated, "[W]e would require an 'impossible prescience' of
courts and attorneys if we faulted them for failing to predict our resolu-
tion of the Boykin-Tahl issue."'' 1  This passage, rather than represent-
ing a true analysis by the court, is a recitation of the determination
made in Gallegos and Tahl. It betrays the fact that the court either
failed or refused to recognize the faot that in the Mills situation the
reliance on the old rule was virtually nonexistent.
Having thus analyzed the second element of the Linkletter-Tehan
test, the court addressed -the third element, the effect of retroactive
97. "The Boykin-Tahl requirements have been expressly applied to misdemeanor
cases and to drunk driving cases." Hanlon & Ferber, The Talisman of In re Tahl:
The Effects on Misdemeanor Drunk Driving Convictions, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 437, 446
(1973) (footnote omitted).
98. CALIFORNIA COLLEGE OF TRIAL JUDGES, MISDEMEANOR PROCEDURE BENCH
BOOK 52-53 (1971).
99. See cases cited note 5 supra.
100. 10 Cal. 3d at 309, 515 P.2d at 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
101. Id. at 309, 515 P.2d at 288, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (citation omitted).
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application upon the administration of justice. Alluding to the vast
number of guilty pleas entered between the date of Boykin and that
of Mills, the court concluded -that the retroactive application of Mills
would have a "dolorous effect on the administration of justice.
°1 0 2
The second and third elements of the Linkletter-Tehan test are
merely elements which, in combination, weigh towards the impracti-
calities of a retroactive application. Through its presentation of the
reliance on the old rule, the court, in effect, vastly exaggerated the
disturbance which would flow from a retroactive application. This
done, the prospective application appeared to be the logical result of
the Linkletter-Tehan test, and the court so ruled. Had the actual state
of the law been confronted, the supreme court's test might well have
yielded a different result.
The anomaly of Mills becomes clear when the result of that case
is compared to earlier court actions involving similar circumstances.
Cooper v. Justice Court'03 involved an almost identical situation. Both
men had pleaded guilty to drunk-driving charges after the date of Boy-
kin but before the decision in Mills. Neither plea had been handled
in accordance with -the requirements of the Boykin-Tahl rule. Cooper
reached the appellate court level before the Mills decision was handed
down. The court applied the Boykin-Tahl rule and concluded that
the prior conviction was invalid. Thus, Cooper succeeded in his at-
tempt to have his conviction set aside; Mills, as a result of the supreme
court's resolution of the prospectivity issue, failed. No rational justi-
fication can be found -for the discrepancy in the judicial treatment of
these two individuals.
The Mills court itself made reference to the many thousands of
guilty pleas entered in misdemeanor proceedings after the date of Boy-
kin. 04 Appellants who challenged their convictions prior to the Mills
decision often relied successfully on the Boykin-Tahl rule; that remedy
has now been foreclosed. Future appellants in the situation of Mills
and Cooper will have to rely on pre-Boykin law if they wish to chal-
lenge the constitutional validity of their prior convictions. Hence,
Mills v. Municipal Court has created a substantial eddy or backwash
in the procedural evolution of California criminal justice.
The peculiarity of the Mills resolution on prospectivity might
possibly relate to political circumstances not expressly mentioned in
the case. Mills and many of -the cases ultimately affected by its hold-
ing involve drunk driving, a misdemeanor which has become, in recent
years, the subject of extreme public outrage. The California Vehicle
Code reflects -the concern of the legislature that the drunk driver
102. Id. at 310, 515 P.2d at 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
103. 28 Cal. App. 3d 286, 104 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1972).
104. 10 Cal. 3d at 310, 515 P.2d at 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
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should be brought to justice and severely punished, particularly when
a pattern of multiple offenses arises. 1 5 Under the Vehicle Code, the
discretion of the courts with respect to the sentencing of second of-
fenders has been almost totally removed. A second conviction within
five years of the first mandates a suspension of the defendant's driver
license for a full year.1 6 In 1973, statistics released by the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles suggested that the objectives of the legislature
were not being met.'0 7 In vast numbers of cases, prior drunk-driving
convictions were being declared constitutionally invalid and the more
lenient first offender sanctions of the Vehicle Code imposed. This
practice was criticized in the press'0 8 and ultimately became the sub-
ject of close scrutiny by the California Judicial Council. 0 9 According
to figures released by the Department, prior drunk-driving convictions
were declared constitutionally invalid in over 14,000 cases in 1973
alone.110 It has been estimated that seventy percent of these convic-
tions could have withstood constitutional scrutiny had the Boykin-Tahl
rule not been deemed applicable."'
Whether the resolution of the prospectivity issue in Mills v. Mu-
nicipal Court can be attributed to the supreme court's dissatisfaction
with the handling of drunk-driving cases can only be the subject of
speculation. What is indeed quite obvious is that the Mills decision
will have a dolorous effect upon the drunk-driving public, at least on
those members of the class who were convicted between June 2, 1969
and October 25, 1973, and who did not challenge this conviction be-
fore the latter date.
Conclusion
Mills v. Municipal Court held that the Boykin-Tahl rule would
be applied to misdemeanors. This holding was not a revolutionary
innovation in the law, but a mere approval by the supreme court of
105. See note 29 supra.
106. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Supp. 1974).
107. See note 110 & accompanying text infra.
108. L.A. Daily Journal, April 11, 1973; L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 1973, at 1 col. 3;
see Campbell, Courts Try to Close Drunk-Driving Loophole, CALIFORNIA JOURNAL 303
(September, 1973).
109. On August 24, 1973, the California Judicial Council directed "each municipal
and justice court that vacates, sets aside, or otherwise declares invalid a prior convic-
tion for driving under the influence of alcohol" to submit a formal report of the action
to the council. Directive from Wright, C.J., Chairman of the Council, to the lower
court judges, Aug. 24, 1973.
110. K. Uebel, Challenging Priors Under the Influence of Mills and S.B. 1268 at
1, Dec. 1973 (paper prepared for distribution to participants in the 1973 Institute for
Municipal and Justice Court Judges, reprinted in Proceedings of Judicial Workshop,
Judges, Marshals and Constables Association, Mar. 1974, at 26).
111. Id.
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what had been common practice in the lower courts prior to its deci-
sion. Mills is an important case in its clarification of the Boykin-Tahl
requirements in the misdemeanor context, an area where confusion
had existed. Misdemeanor defendants may elect to enter pleas of
guilty through counsel rather than in person, provided that they follow
procedures comparable to those utilized in the Wicks case. Lower
courts will be permitted to devise new procedures which deviate from
the rigidities of In re Tahl, provided that these procedures satisfy the
basic demands of -the Boykin and Tahl decisions. The prospectivity
of application, rather than avoiding a detrimental effect upon the ad-
ministration of justice, will have the effect of denying to some 'the due
process safeguards which others similarly situated had previously re-
ceived as a matter of course.
William T. Manierre*
* Member, Third year class.
